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Equal pay by gender and by nationality: 
a comparative analysis of Switzerland’s 
unequal equal pay policy regimes 
across time
Roland Erne and Natalie Imboden*
What explains the adoption of two different policies on equal pay by gender (EPG) 
and by nationality (EPN) in Switzerland? And why is the liberal, litigation-based, 
equal pay policy regime set up by the Gender Equality Act of 1996 much less effec-
tive than the neocorporatist ‘accompanying measures’ to the Bilateral European 
Union–Switzerland Agreement on Free Movement of Persons adopted in 1999 to 
ensure equal pay for workers of different national origins? The formation of two 
different policy regimes cannot be explained by different levels of political will. 
Equally, different ‘varieties of capitalism’ cannot explain the setup of the two dif-
ferent equal pay policy regimes within the very same country. Instead, our quali-
tative comparative analysis across time suggests that the differences can be best 
explained by a particular constellation of attributes, namely the use of different 
policy frames—i.e. ‘anti-discrimination’ in the EPG and ‘unfair competition’ in the 
EPN case—and the different setting of interest politics epitomised by the opposite 
stances adopted by Switzerland’s employer associations in the two cases.
Key words: Equality, Gender, Migrant workers, Equal pay, Switzerland, European 
Union
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1. Introduction
This article seeks to explain the establishment of two different equal pay policy 
regimes in Switzerland—i.e. equal pay by gender (EPG) and equal pay by nationality 
(EPN)—as well as their unequal effectiveness. The period under scrutiny stretches 
from the late 1990s, when Swiss policymakers enshrined both the EPG and EPN 
principles in law, to 2014, when it became evident that both equal pay policy regimes 
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were facing new challenges, albeit for different reasons. Whereas employer associ-
ations rejected a further strengthening of the EPN policy regime in 2013, as was 
often the case when neocorporatist arrangements became too restrictive for capital in 
the past (Schmitter and Grote, 1997), the government proposed in October 2014 a 
reinforcement of the EPG law (Bundesrat 2014), despite employer resistance. In so 
doing, the government was following the advice of a governmental expert group that 
criticised the existing EPG regime as ineffective and suggested new EPG enforcement 
measures, including mandatory audits of companies’ payroll accounts (Müller et al., 
2013). Incidentally, it is precisely this measure that proved to be a central feature in 
Switzerland’s EPN regime.
In 1996 the Gender Equality Act (GEA) came into force to provide mechanisms 
to redress violations of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value for men and 
women. As far back as 1981, the Swiss people had approved a corresponding consti-
tutional amendment by referendum and, on the 10th anniversary of the amendment 
in 1991, the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions (SGB-USS) organised a widely fol-
lowed national women’s strike for its implementation. In 1999 the Swiss people also 
approved several bilateral agreements with the European Union (EU) by referendum, 
including the bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFM) between 
the EU and Switzerland in conjunction with a package of ‘accompanying measures’ 
that ended an era of unequal legal treatment of workers of different origins on the 
Swiss labour market. Whereas the accompanying measures aim at the prevention of 
‘unfair competition’ or ‘social dumping’ in the Swiss labour market, the AFM intro-
duced into Swiss law the principle of ‘equal treatment’ for European workers regard-
less of their nationality.1
If one compares the GEA’s enforcement mechanisms on equal pay with those of 
the accompanying measures, one is struck by the different implementation strategies 
employed in the two cases. The enforcement of equal pay for men and women relies on 
litigation, which means that remedies must be sought by individual plaintiffs through 
the court system; nota bene in a situation in which there is no meaningful protection 
against unjustified dismissals.2
Thus, Switzerland’s EPG regime mirrors the individualistic labour market regime 
that is characteristic of countries that are usually classified as ‘liberal market economies’ 
(LMEs). In contrast, Switzerland’s EPN regime mirrors the neocorporatist patterns 
that exemplify ‘coordinated market economies’ (CMEs). Accordingly, infringements 
1 ‘An employed person who is a national of a Contracting Party may not, by reason of his nationality, be 
treated differently in the territory of the other Contracting Party from national employed persons as regards 
conditions of employment and working conditions, especially as regards pay, dismissal, or reinstatement or 
re-employment if he becomes unemployed’ (Annex 1, Article 9, AFM—Agreement between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the 
free movement of persons). Whereas it has been established that the AFM prohibits direct and indirect 
discriminations of EU workers in Switzerland (Kantonsgericht Basel-Landschaft, 2012; Schweizerisches 
Bundesgericht, 2013), the Swiss courts have not yet decided whether the AFM obligates employers to pay 
workers equal pay for work of equal value or just equal pay for equal work.
2 Unions or women’s organisations ‘may in their own names have a finding of discrimination declared if 
the probable outcome of proceedings will have an effect on a considerable number of jobs’ (Article 7, GEA). 
But even if a court confirms discrimination in response to a collective complaint, each affected individual 
must file a personal redress claim in the courts for compensation in turn. This, however, is a risky endeav-
our, as unjustified terminations of employment contracts remain valid under Swiss labour law. Unfairly 
dismissed employees are entitled only to an indemnity that is determined by a judge but cannot exceed six 
months’ wages.
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of the principle of EPN are usually not the subject of court proceedings, despite the 
AFM’s explicit direct and indirect anti-discrimination provisions.3 Instead, this prin-
ciple is enforced by bi- or tripartite commissions that have obtained extensive inves-
tigation and enforcement powers following several legal changes resulting from the 
‘accompanying measures’ to the AFM. Thus victims of pay discrimination frequently 
alert a union about their circumstances. Subsequently, the union usually requests an 
audit of the suspected company’s payroll accounts by the competent commission, 
without revealing the name of its informant. Likewise, individual companies can sug-
gest an examination of a competitor’s payroll account to ensure a level playing field in 
a given economic sector.
If one compares the number of enforcement actions taken by tripartite commis-
sions to impose equal pay for workers of different national origins with the number 
of gender-related pay discrimination cases that are taken to Swiss courts, one is also 
struck by the huge difference in the policing and enforcement of equal pay policies in 
the two areas. Whereas tripartite commissions checked the payroll accounts in over 
35,000 companies in 2010, the Swiss courts examined fewer than 100 gender-related 
pay discrimination cases in the same year. Given that origin-based pay discrimination 
is significant in specific sectors with a high percentage of posted workers while gender-
related pay discrimination is prevalent everywhere, the unequal enforcement of equal 
pay policies across gender and national origin is even more puzzling.4
The focus of this qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) across time is the develop-
ment of two equal pay regimes that occurred at the same time within the very same 
country. This allows us to avoid the inherent methodological nationalism of the ‘varie-
ties of capitalism’ (VoC) literature (Crouch, 2009; Erne, 2013). Nonetheless, the VoC 
literature provides us with useful insights (Rubery, 2011), even if pay gaps are rising 
in some CMEs, notably due to the growth of a non-unionised low-wage sector in 
countries without statutory minimum wages. In Germany for example, the low-paid 
part-time ‘mini jobs’ created by the supply side-oriented ‘Hartz reforms’ amounted 
‘to nearly 7 million workers in May 2005, of whom 70 per cent are women’ (Fagan 
et al., 2006, p. 582; see also Smith, 2012). What makes the VoC literature intelligent 
is not the use of stylised ‘national models’ by some of its followers, but its holistic 
approach, according to which interrelated complementary configurations—rather than 
individual independent variables—explain socio-economic outcomes. Accordingly, we 
have chosen a qualitative comparative research design, which distinguishes itself from 
conventional quantitative approaches by its configurational approach and its search for 
set relations (Fiss, 2007; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).
3 The private sector union, Unia, recently backed an EPN-related test litigation case. In the case, the courts 
ruled that the selective enforcement of wage cuts by an engineering company through a notice of ‘dismissal 
pending a change of contract’ that was sent only to Grenzgänger (employees who live abroad and commute 
daily across borders to go to work) and not to its local workforce violated the AFM’s anti-discrimination clause. 
The Grenzgänger who challenged the discriminatory wage cuts nevertheless lost their jobs (and therefore any 
future claims for wage payments). The courts in turn only obliged the employer to cover the litigation costs for 
its former employees, to pay outstanding overtime pay and compensation equal to four monthly salaries for 
‘abusive dismissal’ (Kantonsgericht Basel-Landschaft, 2012; Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, 2013).
4 The fewer than 100 EPG cases taken in 2010 should be compared with Switzerland’s pay gap of 13.3% 
in the public and 21.1% in the private sector (Eurostat, 2013) and its comparably large female labour force. 
In 2012 the female employment rate in Switzerland was 61%. This figure is above the Swedish female 
employment rate (60%), the EU member state with the highest figure, and well above the rate in its neigh-
bouring countries: Austria, 55%; Germany, 54%; France, 52%; and Italy, 40% (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2013).
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The next section justifies our study’s approach in relation to the existing literature 
and presents a set of common and distinctive factors that provide the basis for our QCA 
across time. We then assess the formation and unequal effectiveness of the two Swiss 
equal pay policy regimes—for men and women (Section 3) and for workers of different 
origins (Section 4)—in greater detail across time. We focus our analysis on the dynamics 
within and between employers, unions and women’s organisations, given the important 
role played by interest politics in the socio-economic sphere. Finally, the chronological 
accounts of the process of the policymaking trajectories in the two parallel cases are 
used to assess the explanatory power of the different factors included in the ‘truth table’ 
of our QCA.
2. Assessing equal pay and varieties of capitalism: a ‘natural’ experiment
Although equal pay for men and women for work of equal value is the legal norm in 
almost all LMEs, comparative political economists have shown that wage inequalities 
of all kinds tend to be smaller in CMEs. Accordingly, using aggregate national meas-
ures, such as union density or collective bargaining coverage (Blau and Kahn, 2003; 
Rueda and Pontusson, 2000), scholars have explained a large part of the international 
differences in the gender pay gap in terms of different national labour market institu-
tions. Given the unavoidably aggregate nature of the measures on which cross-national 
quantitative studies rely, it is difficult to ascertain which specific labour market and 
equal pay policy mechanisms explain pay gaps across countries. This is either because 
reliable comparative measures are not available5 or because national differences in pay 
and pay inequalities can be caused by a wide array of explanatory factors that are not 
amenable to effective control.6
One way of advancing our knowledge on the relationship between pay gaps, equality 
law and labour market institutions consists in also adopting complementary analytical 
approaches (Galtung, 1990), as has been done by many qualitatively oriented scholars 
who have analysed different equal policy regimes at the national or workplace level. 
Given that the quantitative comparative literature in the field confirms that CMEs are 
better at reducing income inequalities, it is striking that a clear majority of qualitative 
studies are situated in LMEs.
English-speaking scholars are divided between (i) those who criticise the overly pre-
scriptive, complex and therefore presumably ineffective hard law and (ii) those who 
fustigate the weak contribution of soft law, corporate social responsibility policies and 
voluntarist industrial relations in addressing the gender pay gap (McLaughlin, 2014; 
Deakin et al., 2013; Conley, 2012; Dickens, 1999). This polarisation of the debate, 
however, may be neither a consequence of a universal truth, i.e. the unavoidably 
autopoietic nature of the legal subsystem of society (Luhmann, 1989), nor the result 
of the ignorance of those who fail to see the way out of Luhmann’s system theory 
offered by ‘reflexive regulation’ (McLaughlin, 2014, p. 4). Instead, this polarisation 
5 Even the most frequently used labour market indicators are not unproblematic, as the supposedly inter-
nationally comparative data published by international organisations such as the ‘union density rate’ or ‘col-
lective bargaining coverage rate’ often mean different things in different countries (Erne, 2014, pp. 238–9).
6 National wage developments and inequalities are also affected by a country’s location in the global 
economy and its particular developmental trajectory, transnational labour migration and other social norms 
and structures that affect the production and reproduction of a country’s labour force, including the division 
of paid and unpaid work (Sassen, 1988; Stan and Erne, 2014).
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may simply be a contingent consequence of LMEs’ notorious difficulties with binding 
institutions of social coordination that are supported by hard law but are not enforced 
through the court system, as is so common in CMEs. After all, CMEs’ neocorporatist 
institutions do not depend on the reflexive nature of deliberation processes, but rather 
on the constraining nature of their bargaining institution as well as on a balance of 
class forces between capital and labour, which make deliberations possible in the first 
place (Grote and Schmitter, 1999). Although many neocorporatist arrangements that 
characterise CMEs have proved beneficial for employers as a group, they have never-
theless limited the management prerogative of individual employers (Streeck, 1997). 
We have therefore chosen to study equal pay policies in a country in which political 
‘entrepreneurs’ make use of both liberal and coordinated approaches to social regula-
tion. Even if corporatist arrangements play a central role in the Swiss case (Kriesi and 
Trechsel, 2008), the concomitant presence of ‘redundant’ liberal features may not only 
be crucial in explaining institutional change across time, as shown by Colin Crouch 
(2005), but also internal variation across sectors and policy areas.
Our selection of two parallel cases also provides us with a genuine QCA research 
design (Ragin, 1989; Caramani, 2009; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Although the 
explanatory factors that we are assessing are not controlled in the traditional sense of 
a randomised experiment, our study can be viewed as a natural experiment because 
our deliberate case selection allows us to control for a wide range of explanatory fac-
tors. Our parallel cases triggered both liberal and neocorporatist equal pay policy 
regimes, even though they evolved within the same political system during the same 
time period—involving the same government, population, political parties, unions and 
employer organisations. Our comparative analysis is thus based on a ‘most similar case’ 
design that allows us to control for factors recurrently used to explain the use of differ-
ent regulatory designs across countries. This allows us to systematically assess alterna-
tive explanatory factors to explain different policy outcomes, namely levels of political 
will, dynamics between interest groups, social movements, political parties and the 
government and a different framing of the policy problem in public policy debates. As 
the principle of equal pay for work of equal value in both Swiss cases was approved 
in parliament and in popular referenda with similar majorities, the different outcomes 
cannot be explained by diverging levels of political will and support. However the role 
played by interest groups and social movements differed substantially. Whereas Swiss 
employer organisations supported the accompanying measures that entailed the equal 
pay principle for workers of different origins, they opposed the GEA. As a result, poli-
cymakers could not rely on corporatist mechanisms to implement equal pay policy for 
men and women and this undoubtedly undermined its effectiveness. But why would 
employers reluctantly accept equal pay policies in one field and not in another? After 
all, both policies entail additional costs for capitalists. Following economic sociologists 
and public policy analysis showing that both markets and social policies are social 
constructs (Muller, 2005; Naumann, 2005), this article explains the unequal success 
of the equal pay policies also in terms of the different frames of reference employed 
in the two cases. Table 1 reiterates the set of explanatory factors mentioned above and 
indicates their values based on the following in-depth assessment of each case.
Too often the values included in QCA ‘truth tables’ are the result of approxima-
tions rather than of a long-term engagement with the research field. Consequently, the 
reliability of the empirical information captured in Table 1 must be corroborated by 
a detailed assessment of the processes of policy formation and implementation across 
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time. Therefore the next two sections trace the activities of all actors involved in these 
processes, namely federal and cantonal administrations, parties, unions, employer 
organisations and women’s organisations. Our research is based primarily on an 
analysis of documents published by federal and cantonal authorities, political parties, 
unions, employers’ organisations and women’s and migrants’ associations between 
1990 and 2014. In addition we had numerous conversations with equal opportunities 
officers, industrial relations practitioners and public representatives. We were also able 
to observe internal discussions on equal pay within Swiss trade unions, feminist groups 
and bi- and tripartite commissions on various occasions between 1990 and 2014.
3. Equal pay for men and women: a liberal solution with limited effects
Swiss gender equality policy developed outside the corporatist networks that charac-
terise the country’s employment policy regime. Several collective labour agreements 
(CLA) include gender equality provisions, but there is little coordination between the 
confederation’s gender equality policy and those developed through industrial rela-
tions. Given its direct democratic institutions, however, the country is very open to 
influences from civil society.
Table 1. Switzerland’s unequal equal pay policies by gender and by nationality
Gender  
Equality Acta
Bilateral Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons 
and accompanying measuresb
Factors that explain the enactment of the equal pay principle in both cases 
Political support (population) Yes Yes
Political support (parliament) Yes Yes
Interest group support  
(trade unions)
Yes Yes
Factors that explain the enactment and unequal design of the two equal pay policy regimes
Dominant policy framework 
(anti-discrimination)
Yes Noc
Interest group support  
(women’s organisations)
Yes NA
Liberal regulatory strategy  
based on individual litigation
Yes No
Dominant policy framework  
(fair competition)
No Yes
Interest group support  
(employer associations)
No Yes
Neocorporatist regulatory 
strategy (payroll audits by 
tripartite commissions with  
law enforcement powers)
No Yes
Policy outcomes
Effective enforcement  
of equal pay policy
No Yes
aThe Gender Equality Act enshrines equal pay for work of equal value for men and women.
bThe bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons and the accompanying measures enshrine 
equal pay for all EU/EEA workers in any one location, irrespective of their country of origin.
cThe AFM nevertheless also outlaws any direct and indirect discrimination based on nationality.
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Since 1981 the legal equality of women and men and the principle of equal pay for 
work of equal value have been enshrined in the Swiss Constitution. This followed a 
popular initiative entitled ‘Equal Rights for Men and Women’, which resulted from 
the political mobilisation of the women’s movement in both its traditional and modern 
forms (Chaponnière-Grandjean, 1983; Joris and Witzig, 2001). The 1981 constitu-
tional amendment led to new legislation governing marriage and the GEA, which 
came into force in 1996. It gave effect to the right to equal pay for work of equal 
value enshrined in the Constitution and prohibits discrimination in employment in 
principle. The adoption of the act was preceded by a huge mobilisation of women’s 
organisations and unions, including a successful national ‘women’s strike’ on 14 June 
1991, involving around half a million women, i.e. more women than were actually 
union members. The strike was called by the unions on the 10th anniversary of the 
vote on the 1981 equal rights amendment to protest against the failure to implement 
the Constitution’s equality principle.7
The GEA has been celebrated as a milestone in gender equality policy in employ-
ment. Apart from granting women’s access to litigation, however, the GEA does not 
contain any effective enforcement mechanisms; this means that GEA implementa-
tion has effectively been individualised. Proactive state action in monitoring gender 
pay gaps relates only to the public procurement process. Although the principle of 
equal pay has been enshrined in law, its implementation is largely left to the affected 
employees; this means that Swiss gender equality policy relies on a ‘liberal’ public 
policy regime (Fuchs, 2008, 2010; Imboden, 2008). Up to 2013, around 600 gender 
discrimination cases had been documented, with 2009 being a record year when 128 
cases were brought in the German-speaking parts of Switzerland alone. One half of 
all cases relate to pay and the majority of cases are from the public sector: in admin-
istration, education, health and social care. A number of successful union-sponsored 
litigation cases in the public service, brought by healthcare workers and kindergarten 
teachers, led to substantial wage increases and back payments (Fuchs, 2013).
In comparison to the UK, where strategic litigation became the primary strategy in 
the fight against the pay gap (Guillaume, 2013; Deakin et al., 2013; Dickens, 2006), 
equal pay claims occur less frequently in Switzerland. In comparison to the derisory 
low figures of equal pay litigation in Germany (31 cases), France (16 cases) and Poland 
(one case) during the period (1996–2007), the 49 Swiss equal pay cases during same 
time frame do stand out (Fuchs, 2013). Given the lack of protection against revenge 
dismissals, Fuchs’ classification of Switzerland’s gender equality regime as a case of a 
‘strong legal opportunity structure’ seems to be rather far-fetched. Certainly, equal pay 
for men and women is indeed a constitutional right in Switzerland, in contrast to many 
other jurisdictions. In addition, Swiss courts are not confined to the evaluation of 
evidence presented by the litigating parties, but can conduct their own investigations. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of the litigation risk is very unevenly spread. The prob-
ability of an equal pay case being brought against a Swiss company is below 1:12,000. 
By contrast, only 7% of female private sector workers who took their employer to court 
were keeping their posts after litigation (Imboden, 2008). This is not surprising con-
sidering that ‘action still falls to be taken by those discriminated against, rather than 
7 Although political strikes are not protected by law, on 19 October 1990 the SGB-USS congress surpris-
ingly passed a resolution calling for the organisation of a day-long national women’s strike (Eidgenössische 
Kommission für Frauenfragen, 2001; Schöpf, 1992; Wicki, 1991).
662  R. Erne and N. Imboden
by those in positions of power’ (Dickens, 2006, p. 304). Given the strong political will 
in favour of EPG, however, why have Swiss policymakers nevertheless chosen a liberal 
implementation regime, despite its apparent ineffectiveness?
In the mid-1980s, unions and women’s organisations were very critical of the fact 
that the Swiss authorities had failed to implement the 1981 equality amendment to 
the Constitution. They jointly called for the constitutional EPG clause to be applied 
directly and argued in favour of a speedy introduction of equality legislation. In 1986 
the federal government established an expert group with the remit of examining pay 
inequality and presenting appropriate policy solutions. As is customary in Swiss poli-
tics, the expert group was composed of interest group representatives, civil servants and 
academic experts. Whereas unions and women’s organisations had already supported 
the intention of the Swiss federal government to enact a gender equality act in the 
pre-parliamentary phase of the policymaking process, employer organisations disputed 
both the need and likely effectiveness of legislative action. In addition, employers wor-
ried about legislation interfering with the autonomy of private enterprise (Kaufmann, 
2009). After the national women’s strike of June 1991 and the lobbying of traditional, 
middle-class women’s organisations, however, Switzerland’s mainstream centre-right 
parties also supported the GEA proposal in parliament, despite continued employer 
resistance. In addition, the pro-European mainstream parties of both the centre-right 
and the centre-left supported the GEA in order to act in accordance with EU law 
(Parlamentsdienste, 1995; Fuchs, 2013).
Employer opposition did not prevent the adoption of the GEA. Nevertheless, it 
effectively excluded the adoption of a corporatist implementation regime for the equal 
pay policy for men and women. The federal government gave ‘very heavy weighting’ 
to the objections of employer organisations (Kaufmann, 2009, p. 16). As a result, the 
demands for an authority with investigative powers, the right to inspect documents 
and the right to information in relation to individuals—which had received majority 
support during the consultation process—were rejected during the legislative process 
due to employer opposition. The federal government also decided not to grant special 
investigative powers to the Federal Office for Gender Equality as ‘employers were par-
ticularly worried about the Swiss government interfering in their autonomy and in the 
workplace’ (Bundesrat, 1993, p. 1274). Although academic economists stressed that 
an effective implementation of equal pay policies would increase economic efficiency 
and enhance labour market performance (Littmann-Wernli, 1991), these voices failed 
to influence the preferences of Swiss employers. Hence the GEA failed to assign any 
role either to social partners or to governmental agencies in the implementation of 
the act, despite their significant role in other areas of pay determination. As a result, 
a government-appointed expert group concluded, the effect of the act remains very 
limited (Stutz et al., 2005).
The interest politics dynamics that shape the formation of a public policy also influ-
ence its implementation. It is thus hardly surprising that employer resistance is also 
evident at the level of execution. The implementation of a particular policy is often 
determined less by its own characteristics than by the context of its conception; this 
latter defines the frame of reference for the implementation of the policy by the imple-
mentation actors. Therefore the implementation of the equal pay principle for men 
and women is left to voluntary, non-binding measures that aim to raise employers’ 
awareness and to equally ineffective litigation processes. In 2008 the Swiss govern-
mental department responsible for GEA implementation reiterated its preference for 
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‘voluntary approaches rather than state coercion’ (Bundesamt für Justiz, 2008) and 
initiated a ‘wage-equality dialogue’ with the goal of persuading 100 companies to 
accept an econometric assessment of their employees’ wages and pay scales within five 
years; however with very limited success.
Nevertheless, gender equality issues have played a greater role in the negotiation 
agenda of social partners, first and foremost because of union pressure. As late as 1993, 
every sixth CLA included wage categories—such as ‘light work’ and ‘heavy work’—
that indirectly discriminated against women (Baumann et al., 1995). Meanwhile, pro-
gress has been made with regard to equal pay. Part-time employees are now covered 
by CLAs. Furthermore, commitments have been made to enshrine gender equality 
in different sectors and, in a few cases, new instruments, such as the gender equality 
commission in the metal manufacturing industry, have been introduced. Opposition 
from employers and the low level of union organisation in sectors with a high number 
of female employees mean, however, that collective bargaining results in terms of equal 
pay are still very inadequate. In addition, the organisational power of women within 
unions continues to be relatively weak (Ballmer-Cao, 2000; Monney et  al., 2013), 
although the percentage of female union members has doubled since the 1991 wom-
en’s strike. Within the SGB-USS, the percentage of women increased from a low of 
12.7% in 1990 to 27.4% in 2010 (Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund, 2011, p. 12).
The biggest obstruction on the way to equal pay for men and women, however, 
remains sustained employer resistance. Given the substantial costs of the wage increases 
that would be required to eliminate the gender pay gap, employer opposition against 
a more effective GEA is not surprising. It must also be noted, however, that the GEA 
is not the only act promoting equal pay. Swiss procurement legislation requires com-
panies bidding for tenders to adhere to the principle of wage equality between women 
and men. As a result, the federal government has developed an analytical instrument 
based on econometric regression analysis in order to investigate wages paid in compa-
nies that respond to public tenders (Eidgenössisches Büro für die Gleichstellung von 
Frau und Mann, 2006; Chicha, 2006). But whereas policy debates about the GEA 
were framed in terms of equal rights for men and women, the policy debate in the 
case of the Swiss procurement legislation centred on the avoidance of a distortion of 
competition that is disadvantageous to fair employers. Intriguingly, the latter frame of 
reference proved also to be of utmost importance in the following, second case of our 
analysis.
4. Equal pay for workers of different origins: a more effective 
neocorporatist solution
Despite the Swiss electorate’s narrow rejection of entry into the European Economic 
Area (EEA) in 1992, Switzerland subsequently opened its market to workers and ser-
vice providers from the EU. The opening of the Swiss labour market represented a 
radical change in Swiss migration and labour market policy. Hitherto, Swiss labour 
market policy had been characterised by a discriminatory system of employment per-
mits for migrant workers, which initially had also been supported by the trade unions 
(Schmitter, 1981; Steinauer, 2006).
After the prospect of both EEA and direct EU membership evaporated, EU and 
Swiss policymakers chose a bilateral approach instead and successfully negotiated a 
package of bilateral Switzerland–EU agreements, which led to Switzerland’s integration 
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into the Single Market. In order to facilitate the ratification of the AFM in a popular 
referendum, Swiss policymakers attached a legislative package of accompanying meas-
ures to the Switzerland–EU agreements to facilitate the enforcement of the principle 
of equal pay for workers of different origins. These measures were agreed in 1999 and 
came into effect in June 2004. As a result, both Swiss and foreign employees were to be 
protected from an undercutting of wages in Switzerland. Hence pay and employment 
conditions are no longer linked to an employee’s origin; instead, Swiss migration and 
labour law focuses upon the protection of employment conditions of all employees, 
independent of origin. Abusive undercutting of Swiss wage and employment condi-
tions are to be combated with the help of the following acts and measures.
Firstly, a new federal Posted Workers Act (Entsendegesetz, EntsG) stipulates that 
workers transferred to Switzerland for the purpose of providing a service are subject 
to the wage and employment conditions that apply in Switzerland. The EntsG also 
enables federal and cantonal authorities to impose binding minimum wage conditions 
as part of a normal employment contract in sectors not covered by CLAs.
Secondly, a reinforced federal act on the extension of CLA (Bundesgesetz über die 
Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung von Gesamtarbeitsverträgen) facilitates the legal extension 
of CLAs to all employers and employees operating in a particular economic sector.
Finally, the accompanying measures also include the setting up of tripartite com-
missions, with extensive law enforcement powers, composed of employer, union and 
state representatives at federal and cantonal levels. Interestingly, however, in this policy 
field, Swiss equal pay policy has not been framed in terms of the anti-discrimination 
language that guides the GEA and the AFM. On the contrary, the primary goal of the 
revised legislation is ‘to prevent social dumping and wage dumping that is disadvanta-
geous for employees in Switzerland’ (Bundesrat, 1999, p. 6392).
The accompanying measures are a good example of the functioning of Swiss 
neocorporatism (Oesch, 2007). Given that ‘unions have traditionally been the jun-
ior partner in Switzerland’s corporatist arrangements’ (Oesch, 2011, p. 84), how-
ever, the substantial curtailment of employers’ management prerogatives by the 
measures requires an explanation: ‘Less than a decade after prominent business 
representatives had declared collective agreements a model of the past, employer 
associations had to accept the reinforcement of collectively agreed minimum wages, 
the facilitation of extension clauses and the hiring of works inspectors’ (Oesch, 
2011, p. 92).
According to the liberal theory that has dominated Swiss economic policy for dec-
ades, employers should resist collective labour market regulations, especially with 
regard to wages. Accordingly, Swiss employer associations always clearly rejected 
requests for the introduction of a statutory minimum wage. Until very recently, impor-
tant Swiss employer associations even resisted wage provisions in sectoral collective 
agreements. The so-called peace agreement between Swiss metalworkers’ unions and 
the Employer Association of the Swiss Mechanical Engineering Industry dating back 
to 1937 (Fluder and Hotz-Hart, 1998), for example, did not contain any minimum 
wage provisions until 2013. It is therefore not surprising that the Swiss federation of 
employer associations reiterated in 2011 that ‘the regulation of wages is the responsi-
bility of company owners or shareholders. … There is no acceptable reason for state 
interference’ (Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband, 2011, p.  3). Even so, a major-
ity of Switzerland’s employer organisations de facto accepted the contrary when they 
endorsed the accompanying measures in 1999.
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Employers’ support for the accompanying measures can be explained as follows. 
Firstly, Switzerland’s employers were divided. Important export-oriented Swiss com-
panies, especially in industry, were against these measures as they would decrease their 
international competitiveness. In turn, the more domestic-oriented companies, espe-
cially in the construction industry, fully supported the measures that aimed to prevent 
unfair competition from competitors who would not adhere to Swiss wage agreements 
and working conditions. Secondly, the measures’ tripartite implementation structures 
that guaranteed employers direct access to the policy implementation regime also alle-
viated some fears of unreasonable state interventionism. It is, however, reasonable 
to suggest that the proponents of the accompanying measures within Switzerland’s 
employer organisations would not have been able to overcome the internal employer 
opposition if Swiss unions had not been able to use the popular referenda about the 
bilateral Switzerland–EU agreements as an effective ‘political lever’ (Wyler, 2012).
Despite Switzerland’s relatively low union density rate of only 16.2% (OECD, 2013), 
Swiss unions have often been able to veto undesirable legislative proposals (Fischer, 
2003). Although economic globalisation and Europeanisation processes repeatedly led 
to a decline of union power in most countries, the recurrent need to ensure popular 
majorities in favour of a continuous integration of Switzerland in transnational mar-
kets ironically provided Swiss unions an opportunity in which they were able to make 
use of considerable political mobilisation and exchange power (Afonso, 2010, 2012; 
Afonso et al., 2010; Wyler, 2012). After the rejection of EEA membership in the popu-
lar referendum in 1992—despite the SGB-USS leadership’s unconditional support 
for EEA and even EU membership—Switzerland’s union leaders could convincingly 
argue that further economic integration would only gain popular support if workers’ 
fears about a race to the bottom in wages and labour standards were addressed. At the 
same time, a new, more radical generation of union leaders came to power. Moreover, 
Swiss unions adopted much more inclusive union attitudes towards migrant workers 
and this in turn led to important changes in union membership structure (Steinauer 
and Allmen, 2000; Arlettaz and Arlettaz, 2006). Until the 1992 EEA referendum, 
Swiss union policy primarily reflected the concerns of the predominately Swiss work-
ers employed in the export industry. After 1992, however, union policy increasingly 
emphasised the concerns of Switzerland’s domestic-oriented sectors, ironically also 
because unions proved to be much more successful in organising the migrant workers 
employed in construction and other domestic sectors.
Whereas export-oriented union leaders argued in the 1992 EEA referendum that 
the threat of wage dumping was ‘not all that great’ and even conducted a joint Yes 
campaign with employer organisations (Wyler, 2012, p. 137), employers and unions 
operating in domestic sectors endorsed the EEA agreement much more reluctantly. 
In 1989 the construction workers’ union was already demanding measures against the 
undercutting of wages through the introduction of the ‘local wage principle’ for posted 
workers and asked the SGB-USS to envisage a ‘popular initiative’ against wage dump-
ing. This idea re-emerged when the union confederation discussed its recommendation 
to voters in relation to the EEA referendum. At the time of the EEA vote, however, the 
idea of accompanying measures against wage dumping was far from reaching overall 
consensus, even within the labour movement. Before the EEA vote, not only employers 
but also a leading unionist from the export-oriented manufacturing sector attacked the 
‘cartel-like’ agreements between social partners in the domestic market that would be 
detrimental to consumers and taxpayers (Ghelfi, cited in Wyler, 2011, pp. 150–1). After 
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the negative outcome of the EEA referendum, however, the situation changed. The No 
vote caused uproar within the union movement for two reasons: not only had Swiss 
union leaders to concede that they had not obtained any concessions from employers 
and the government in exchange for their support for the EEA agreement, but also 
they learned that the unions’ rank and file did not follow the union leadership’s voting 
recommendations. Consequently, the Swiss unions changed their strategy in relation 
to the subsequent bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU that replaced 
the rejected EEA agreement. Instead of adopting a ‘Yes But’ approach as in the EEA 
case, the Swiss unions threatened to campaign for a No vote in subsequent European 
integration referenda if their demands for accompanying measures were not integral to 
subsequent referenda packages. This change in union strategy was very effective, since 
the Swiss social partners agreed in April 1999—before the Swiss government started 
its official consultation process—that accompanying measures against social dumping 
were needed to secure the adoption of new bilateral agreements between Switzerland 
and the EU. Despite neoliberal criticism about the increased union influence (Schmid, 
1999), the agreement between Swiss employer associations and unions essentially pre-
empted the later legislation by jointly calling for a ‘Swiss posted workers act’, the ‘local 
wages for posted workers principle’ and ‘legislation against misuse’ of the free move-
ment of workers and services (Wyler, 2012).
Arguably, the 1999 agreement on accompanying measures represented a great suc-
cess for the SGB-USS. Its implementation, however, also depended on the capacity 
of the SGB-USS to overcome its internal divisions between unionists from export-
oriented and from domestic-oriented sectors of the economy. The Unia trade union 
merger between the metalworkers’ union (SMUV) and the construction workers’ 
union (GBI), which took place in 2005, is certain to have played a key role here. It led 
to a shift of the SGB-USS’s centre of attention away from the export industry towards 
more domestic market-oriented sectors. Another change in the union movement with 
regard to membership must also be considered. The percentage of members from an 
immigrant background grew from 32% in 1986 to around 40% in 2007. Since the 
middle of the 1980s, several unions have had a majority of members from an immi-
grant background (Allmen and Steinauer, 2000, p. 43). This is exceptional compared 
with the rest of Europe (Erne, 2008, pp. 90–4). Nevertheless, there are still fewer non-
nationals than women present in Swiss unions’ federal governance structures.
Since the accompanying measures came into force in 2004, the Swiss federal govern-
ment and the cantons can enact minimum wages in cases of repeated abuse. A normal 
employment agreement with a binding minimum wage, however, can only be enacted 
under certain conditions, particularly if customary local wages are repeatedly under-
cut within a sector or a specific occupational field. In 2008, for example, the federal 
tripartite commission successfully requested the introduction of a federal minimum 
wage for domestic service to prevent the predominately female workers from Eastern 
Europe being paid wages well below customary Swiss levels when employed in Swiss 
households (Alleva and Moretto, 2011).
The tripartite commissions are made up of equal numbers of representatives of 
authorities, employers and unions. In sectors with legally binding collective agree-
ments, however, this task is delegated to social partners’ existing bipartite CLA com-
mittees. In 2010 the bi- and tripartite commissions controlled the wages and labour 
standards of 142,535 workers employed in 36,451 companies. Of those, 99,789 work-
ers were employed by Swiss companies and 42,746 where either self-employed or 
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employees of a foreign firm (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft, 2011, p. 18). In addition, 
the parliamentary commission of the lower house in charge of policy implementa-
tion found that every second person posted to Switzerland by a foreign company is 
inspected and that controls are more frequent in sectors with bipartite social partner-
ship institutions. In the construction industry, for example, the payroll accounts of 
50% of all workers have been inspected to ensure compliance with the collectively 
agreed minimum wage. A high number of infringements have been detected in this 
area. The percentage of infringements was around 60%, resulting in significant fines 
and/or back payments (Geschäftsprüfungskommission, 2011, p.  21). According to 
Article 2.2 EntsG, the commissions set up by collective agreements that have been 
declared universally applicable can enforce the payment of substantive contractual 
penalties without delay if an employer refuses to ‘voluntarily’ pay outstanding wages 
within a given time period.
Because of the high number of inspections, a range of avoidance strategies are 
being used by opportunistic employers. There has also been an increase in bogus 
self-employment. In addition, subcontracting and temporary employment is boom-
ing. This is especially prevalent in the construction industry and related trades. The 
responsible parliamentary commission concluded that ‘the system of accompanying 
measures is based upon a central element of the Swiss economy: the relations between 
social partners’. This, however, also means that ‘in areas where social partners have tra-
ditionally been less active, the accompanying measures have hardly been attained at all’ 
(Geschäftsprüfungskommission, 2011, p. 18). The implementation of accompanying 
measures also varies greatly across cantons, reflecting Switzerland’s federal governance 
structure, differences in regional labour markets’ international exposure and different 
regional balances of power between social and political forces.
The weaknesses of the accompanying measures mentioned above and employers’ 
ingenuity in finding various ways around them, however, also led to the adoption of 
two additional packages of accompanying measures. The second package was put to 
a referendum in 2005 in conjunction with the vote on the extension of the AFM for 
the then 10 EU accession countries. A third package proved instrumental in getting 
a clear Yes vote in the 2009 referendum about the extension of the AFM to Romania 
and Bulgaria.8
A fourth package of accompanying measures was discussed in 2013, in view of the 
popular vote on the anti-immigration initiative of the far-right Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP-UDC) and a planned referendum about the extension of the AFM to Croatia. 
However the negotiations about the fourth package largely failed, as the social partners 
and the mainstream pro-European centre-right and centre-left parties failed to agree 
a joint position on the further strengthening of the accompanying measures, with the 
exception of a new provision that makes main contractors liable for their subcontrac-
tors’ unpaid wages. After Switzerland’s pro-European forces narrowly lost the popular 
vote on the SVP-UDC initiative ‘against mass immigration’ on the 9 February 2014 by 
a very slim 50.3 to 49.7% majority, union leaders attributed this defeat to the employ-
ers and authorities that ‘baulked at any further tightening of the flanking measures 
even though this was urgently needed’ (Rechsteiner et al., 2014).
8 The continuous reinforcement of these accompanying measures proved crucially important in securing 
Yes votes in the two subsequent Swiss referenda about the extension of the AFM to 10 new EU member 
states (25 September 2005: Yes vote, 56%) and to Bulgaria and Romania (8 February 2009: Yes vote, 60%).
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5. Discussion
It is has been shown that the unequal implementation of Switzerland’s equal pay poli-
cies cannot be the result of different levels of political support, as the EPG and EPN 
regimes had both been endorsed by the same government and similar majorities in 
parliament. Yet clear differences between the two cases become apparent when the 
corresponding dynamics of interest politics are compared.
Most importantly, Switzerland’s employer organisations consistently resisted politi-
cal interventions aimed at curbing the gender pay gap. In contrast, these associations 
supported the accompanying measures that ensure equal pay for workers of different 
origins. Although the measures openly contradicted the neoliberal policy agenda set 
by Switzerland’s leading capitalists in 1995 (De Pury et al., 1995), Swiss employer 
organisations supported the legal extension of collective bargaining agreements, the 
declaration of statutory minimum wages in some sectors that had no collective bar-
gaining agreements and the bi- and tripartite commissions with extensive powers to 
enforce the payment of customary local wages for workers of different origins. The 
opposite stances adopted by the employer organisations led to very different regulatory 
implementation strategies in the two parallel cases. Whereas the GEA is based on a lib-
eral litigation-based model of policy implementation that obliges those discriminated 
against to take action, the accompanying measures are implemented by neocorporat-
ist policy networks. It is therefore hardly surprising that the principle of equal pay is 
implemented very unequally across the two cases.
Women and women’s organisations arguably play a more important role in Swiss 
politics than migrants and migrants’ organisations. Whereas women’s votes have 
secured a continuous extension of women’s rights since 1971 (Mottier, 1995), most 
propositions aimed at extending the rights of immigrants have been frequently rejected 
in Swiss referenda. In addition, women’s organisations were effectively involved in 
the pre-parliamentarian policymaking processes in the GEA case, whereas migrants’ 
interests were only indirectly represented by unions. Surprisingly, however, women’s 
groups’ higher levels of access and mobilisation in the political process did not lead to 
the adoption of a more efficient equal pay policy. Hence EPG and EPN policy regimes 
and outcomes do not vary because of the relevant groups’ different levels of political 
mobilisation, as recurrently assumed.
Variation is better explained by different interest politics dynamics and the particu-
lar frames of reference that guide the policymaking process in a particular field. If we 
compare the policy framework in our two parallel cases, notable differences can be 
discerned. Whereas equal pay policies for men and women are framed in the language 
of anti-discrimination policy, the principle of equal pay for workers of different origins 
enshrined in the accompanying measures is aimed at guaranteeing a level playing field 
for all companies in a given sector. The Swiss gender pay gap policy debate has been 
framed as a debate about the reallocation of money from capital to female workers. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that employer organisations resisted effective EPG 
interventions. In contrast, the Swiss policy debate about equal pay for workers of dif-
ferent origins was not portrayed as a conflict that sets different class interests against 
one another. Instead, the debate was framed in non-distributive terms as a debate 
about employment practices that undermine fair competition. The employer organisa-
tions endorsed this policy to prevent unfair competition from free-riders who refuse to 
adhere to collectively agreed wage settlements and to increase the popular support for 
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Switzerland’s participation in the Single European Market. On the other hand, both 
Swiss and migrant workers supported the measures because they are an effective tool 
in the fight against social dumping and for equal pay and working conditions.
However, the adoption of the accompanying measures also required a certain bal-
ance of class forces, as in neocorporatist arrangements generally, as well as a particular 
balance of power within the organisations of capital and labour. Switzerland’s major 
union confederation, the SGB-USS, would have hardly been able to threaten a No 
vote recommendation in the recurrent referenda on bilateral EU–Switzerland agree-
ments in the event of failure to provide adequate accompanying measures, if the centre 
of gravity within the SGB-USS had not shifted from export-oriented to domestic-
oriented sectors during the 1990s. Swiss unions’ exceptional successes in organising 
migrant workers in the 1990s also made a substantial difference. The increased effort 
to secure equal pay for workers of different origins reflects the increased presence of 
migrant workers in Swiss unions as much as the increased influence of the unions that 
organise construction and private service workers’ unions within the SGB-USS.
The narrow victory of the SVP-UDC initiative on 9 February 2014, which can in 
part be attributed to the lack of renewal of the class compromise in favour of accom-
panying measures that had hitherto been sustaining the AFM, shows that corporatist 
compromises are inherently fragile. After the employer organisations and the Liberals 
(FDP-PLR) prevented a further extension of the accompanying measures, neither the 
Liberals and Christian-Democrats nor the Social-Democrats (SP-PS) and Greens 
campaigned passionately against the SVP-UDC proposal. After the vote, the FDP-PLR 
president justified his party’s stance by stating that there is a point at which the regu-
latory costs of further ‘illiberal’ accompanying measures simply exceed the benefits 
from the bilateral agreements with the EU (Müller, 2014). It remains to be seen 
whether organised capital and organised labour will manage to find common ground 
on the free movement of people and the renewal of the accompanying measures before 
Switzerland’s voters will be asked again to determine their country’s future relation-
ship with the EU in 2016 or 2017. Given the clear determination of the employers’ 
associations and unions to save the bilateral agreements with the EU, it seems, how-
ever, rather unlikely that far-right politicians and employers will succeed in disman-
tling the existing accompanying measures that are meant to enforce the EPN principle. 
In this context it is also noteworthy that the rejection of strict immigration limits in the 
recent popular vote on the so-called ‘Ecopop initiative’ by 74% of the Swiss voters on 
30 November 2014 has been interpreted by the major parties as a ‘Yes to the bilateral 
treaties with the EU’ (Geiser, 2014).
6. Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that the liberal frames of references of gender equality policy – 
which are predicated on individual anti-discrimination law – do not provide the most 
effective policy framework for the closure of the gender pay gap. The more equal pay 
policies were framed in terms of providing a level playing field for competing firms, 
the more they were acceptable to organised capital. And the more employer organisa-
tions were supportive of equal pay policy principles, the more effectively they can be 
implemented through collective, corporatist policy regimes. For this reason, our study 
provides a compelling argument for reframing gender equal pay policies to make them 
more acceptable for employer organisations, as in the case of EPN. Incidentally, the 
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equal, level playing field argument had already proved to be critical in the discussions 
that led to the introduction of the EPG principle into the EEC Treaty in 1957 in the 
first place. If the French employers’ had not feared the unfair competition of under-
paid Italian female workers, the principle would not have been included in the Treaty 
(Hoskyns, 1996; Allais, 1960).
The history of the Swiss EPN regime, however, has also been a history of constantly 
‘moving goal posts’ as in the EPG case (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2013). As long as we 
are living in a capitalist society, opportunistic employers will always try to find ways 
around labour and equality law. It must therefore be reiterated that the framing of 
equal pay policies as a ‘beneficial constraint’ (Streeck, 1997) is acceptable for business 
interests only if a particular set of power constellations sustain them (Wright, 2004). 
It would therefore be wrong to conclude that the findings of this study would justify 
a detached state, as simple ‘business case’ advocates for equal pay may be arguing. 
However beneficial equal pay policies may be for business as a whole, they must con-
strain every single company to be effective.
Finally, the comparison of equal pay policies by gender and by nationality not only 
turned out to be a good choice for the methodological reason outlined in Section 2.  
The larger thematic scope of our equal pay study also helps to explain an unexpected 
policy shift in Switzerland’s EPG regime. On 22 October 2014, the Swiss govern-
ment proposed a substantive revision of the Gender Equality Act. If the amendment 
is enacted, companies with more than 50 employees would become subject to com-
pulsory ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ audits of their pay structure, which must 
be conducted either jointly by trade unions and employer associations or by quali-
fied external auditors (Bundesrat, 2014). The proposed amendment follows an expert 
group report, which first assessed different equal pay policy regimes (including the 
Swiss EPN regime) and then suggested the introduction of compulsory audits of 
companies’ payroll accounts to close the gender pay gap (Müller et al., 2013). Once 
it becomes socially acceptable for external inspectors to get access to firms’ payroll 
accounts to fight social dumping in relation to non-national workers, the more likely 
it is that the state will require external equal pay audits as well in order to tackle the 
gender pay gap.
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